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This paper explores, through a series of experiments, the effect of shill bidding upon revenues 
and prices in auctions.  We study the practice of shill bidding in a common value framework.  
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that, if bidders are aware of the 
possibility of seller participation in an auction, shill bidding lowers profits on average. Shill 
bidding can alleviate the problem of the winner's curse by lowering the price and it can, thus, 
provide benefits to the bidders.  Finally, even though there were too many bidders that submitted 
bids in these auctions, the number of entrants was not affected by the possibility of seller 
participation, which is also consistent with the theory.  
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1.  Introduction 
There is an increasing concern over shill bidding in Internet auctions.  Shill bidding (or 
shilling) occurs when the seller of an item poses as a bidder and submits bids in an auction in an 
effort to raise its price.  Auction sites spend large amounts of money to prevent this activity.  The 
persistence of shilling can affect the popularity of Internet auctions as effective trading 
mechanisms.  Incidents of shilling have  also  been reported in traditional  English auctions for 
many years (see Cassady (1967), and Lucking-Reiley (2000)).  In their study of how auctions 
affected trade at the beginning of the 19
th century, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Nonnenmacher 
(1999) reveal that this practice was widespread at that time. A change in New York’s legislature 
introduced  in 1817 created disincentives for shillers. As a result, the activity subsided 
contributing to the city’s rapid growth. Shill bidding has important implications for the success of 
markets and studying its effects is of direct policy relevance. Rothkopf and Harstad (1995) for 
example attributed the rareness of Vickrey auctions outside financial markets partly to the fear of 
cheating sellers.   
In this paper, we report the findings of experiments that study the practice of shill bidding.  
We investigate its effect on the bidding behavior and revenues of the seller in common value 
auctions.  We chose this framework because a large number of items auctioned on-line are 
collectibles (such as antiques stamps and sports memorabilia) and second hand goods whose 
value is uncertain.
1  Bidders estimate how much these items are worth based on their private 
information and the behavior of the other bidders.  In such auctions, the seller can enter bids to 
mislead the actual bidders and generate aggressive bidding patterns.  In the process, he runs the 
risk of developing a bad reputation that could persist in future transactions. Bidders often express 
worries about sellers’ past suspect behavior. 
The rapid increase of transactions over the Internet will create many more opportunities for 
shill bidding in the future because sellers can easily disguise their identities.  Despite their large 
spending on this, many bidders have complained that auction sites are not doing all they can to 
discourage fraud.  They attribute the reluctance to take action against some sellers to the fact that 
                                                                 
1 According to Bajari and Hortacsu (2002) approximately 50% of the listings on eBay, the most popular 
auction site, can be classified as collectibles.  Se also Lucking-Reiley (2000) and Bajari and Hortacsu 
(2004).   2 
higher prices will ultimately generate higher commissions. Do prices really increase when bidders 
anticipate the behavior of the seller?  The recent theoretical work by Chakraborty and 
Kosmopoulou (2004) shows that shill bidding does not benefit the seller and is some cases it does 
not benefit the auctioneer either.  This theory triggered our interest in the practical consequences 
of this action. Our experiments reveal that shill bidding lowers both prices and profits contrary to 
the seller's intentions. In that sense, it alleviates the problem of the winner's curse in common 
value auctions. The information collected from the data allowed us to explore entry decisions and 
the extent of observational learning.  
There are important practical difficulties in using empirical data to investigate the effect of 
shilling on bidding behavior and profits.  Detection of shill bidding is difficult in Internet 
auctions. Such information whenever it is available, it is typically sensitive and  is kept 
confidential.  It is also  impossible to determine bidders’ knowledge of the occurrence of the 
practice.  We created a computerized auction experiment that allowed us to trace the seller's 
participation patterns. We could control the amount of information that is available to bidders by 
carefully announcing the possibility of seller participation according to profit expectations.   
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the modeling framework and some 
related literature.  Section 3 describes the experiment, while section 4 reports and evaluates the 
results.  Section 5 summarizes our findings. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
We consider an open ascending auction in which the highest bidder is awarded the item at the 
second-highest bid price.  Each bidder receives an independent common value signal si taking 
values from a uniform distribution.  The value of the item is defined as the average of the n 
bidders' signals: 
In this auction environment (i) there is a reserve price, (ii) entry takes place simultaneously 
and (iii) bidders cannot reenter once they have exited. Bidders bid the expected value of the item 
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progresses (see among others Milgrom and Weber (1982)).  This modeling framework has been 
previously used in many theoretical and experimental papers.
2 
For simplicity, we assume that the seller has no value for the item and no information that 
could be useful to the bidders.  He has, however, the ability to participate in some auctions—and 
submit shill bids—if he finds it beneficial.  The bidders do not know whether the seller is shill 
bidding, but they have a common belief in the probability that he does.  
Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) recently analyzed the possibility of shill bidding in 
common value auctions.  They showed that the bidders take into account the potential for seller 
participation at the auction and revise their bids accordingly.  Their work makes the following 
testable predictions for our framework of analysis:  
(i)  If bidders are aware of the possibility of seller participation in an auction, shill bidding makes 
the seller worse off.  Sellers would prefer it if there were a well-established, strict 
enforcement mechanism that makes it impossible for them to participate.  





Subjects participated in 20 sessions that lasted for one-and-a-half hour and consisted of a 
series of 18 auctions each.
5  They were recruited from a wide cross-section of undergraduate 
students at the University of Oklahoma and each participated in one session. In each auction, 
there were at maximum five potential players. Each player was either a true bidder or a seller.  
                                                                 
2 Experiments include Avery and Kagel (1997), Holt and Sherman (2000), and Goeree and Offerman 
(2002).  Theoretical work includes Albers and Harstad (1991), Bikhchandani and Riley (1991), Klemperer 
(1998), and Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999). 
3 Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) assume, in general, that the expected value of the item increases in 
the number of bidders with high estimates of the value.  In Theorem 6, they show that the prices can 
increase in a mixed strategy shill bid equilibrium if ex ante (1) at most one bidder is expected to have a 
high signal at the auction and/or (2) the estimate of the common value increases at an increasing rate with 
the participation of additional bidders.  In a common value auction, you don't expect ex ante that only one 
bidder will value the item highly and everyone else will have low estimates unless there is a rare negative 
correlation in the estimates of the value.  When signals are uniformly distributed, as in this case, a mixed 
participation strategy should reduce the price and the potential for shill bidding should make the seller 
worse off. 
4 For more information on the design, please see the instructions and the snapshots from an experiment 
presented in Figures 1-12B in Appendix B.  
5 We performed 22 auctions, 4 of which were trial runs to familiarize the subjects with the auction 
environment.    4 
The assignment was decided at the beginning of the session from a random draw.  Our intention 
was to evaluate how bidders learn and how they adjust their bidding strategies to the seller's 
behavior. The experiments were completely computerized and in each session there were two 
treatments: in one the seller could not participate and in the other he could.
6 Subjects received 
instructions for the second treatment only after the set of auctions of the first treatment were 
completed.  The order of treatments was changed in some sessions to check for robustness of our 
results.  
(i) The auction format.  In each auction, a single unit of a commodity was sold to the 
highest bidder at the second-highest bid price.  We followed the "ascending clock design" in 
which there is a digital clock on the screen.  The clock started at a particular bid (reflecting the 
reserve price) and moved upwards every 5 seconds.  Each bidder was able to observe the clock 
and the process was interactive.
7 
(ii) The distribution of values.  The values of all items were determined the same way.  
Prior to the auction, the bidders received signals revealing partial information about the value of 
the object.  The average of the observed signals determined the value.  Each signal was an integer 
drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 20.  The signal and the distribution of signals 
were the only information available ex ante to bidders that could help them make decisions about 
entry. The seller did not receive any information ex ante that could be relevant to the bidders. The 
seller's value was zero.   
(iii) The instructions.  Subjects were given a set of instructions designed to help them 
understand the nature of each object for sale and how to calculate the common value (see 
appendix B).  The seller was given the opportunity to bid only in some auctions and his potential 
                                                                 
6 In those auctions, the seller could observe the outcome of the bidding process and learn as much as every 
bidder would. 
7 The ascending clock design is used widely in the literature (see among others Kagel, Harstad and Levin 
(1987) and the Kagel (1995)). We did not use the format that specifies an ending time for these auctions for 
two reasons. First and foremost, in a common value auction the fixed ending time rule posed an incentive 
problem:  bidders should w ait until the last minute to avoid revealing their private information (see 
Lucking-Reiley (2000)). According to Bajari and Hortacsu (2004): “ If all bids arrive at the last minute, a 
bidder will not be able to update his beliefs about the common value V using the bids of others, hence his 
bidding decision would be equivalent to that of a bidder in a sealed-bid second price auction.” It turns out, 
that theoretically the fixed ending time rule would render shill bidding ineffective in equilibrium since the 
seller would run the risk of becoming the highest bidder of the item without having the benefit of raising 
the expected price conditional on sale.  The second less important and more practical reason (which is 
relevant in traditional English auctions) is that the auctions ended in a matter of minutes.   5 
for participation, was announced to all bidders.  The seller was able to passively observe the 
outcome of the experiments in all auctions in which he had no ability to participate.  The bidders 
were given an initial budget of $15 to participate in the auctions
8.  We had 100 participants 
overall in the 20 sessions.  Subjects were given enough time to read the instructions that were 
subsequently read aloud to them.  The instructions included examples that illustrated how the 
auctions worked, and how the subjects could determine their profits or losses. 
(iv) The bidding.  At the beginning of each auction, a reserve price (a minimum acceptable 
bid) was posted on the screen.  After each bidder received his signal he had to decide whether or 
not to participate.  When all bidders made their decisions the auction would start.  The digital 
clock would appear on each screen along with information about the remaining cash balance.  By 
clicking on a button next to the clock, marked "Bid Here," a bidder would be able to stop his 
clock and determine his dropout price.  When a sole clock was left active, the remaining bidder 
obtained the object at the price shown by the clock the moment the last-but-one bidder withdrew 
from the auction.  Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the session (See Figures 2 -5B in 
appendix B). 
(v) The information feedback.  The site also displayed information about the item that was 
auctioned off.  At any point in time, when an auction was underway, the bidding history 
(consisting of the dropout prices of all the bidders) was posted on the site.  We concealed the 
identity of the bidders from each other to avoid direct identification of the seller's bid at any given 
auction.  After each round, the true value, the winning bid, profit (or loss) and updated cash 
balances were reported to all bidders on their screens.  The number of active bidders was not 
announced at the beginning, but it could be inferred from the number of dropout prices at the 
conclusion of each auction.  This is because, in many auctions (including all Internet auctions), 
the actual number of participants is not known ex ante [see also the discussion in McAfee and 
Vincent (1992)]. 
The design of the auction experiment has the characteristics of the ascending clock design, an 
auction environment analyzed among others by Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004).  Bidders 
                                                                 
8 To cover for 'bankruptcies' and 'no-showers,' we had extra bidders (up to two) in each experimental 
session.  The active bidders in each session were selected on a 'first-come-first-serve' basis.  We did not 
observe any bankruptcies.  Extra bidders were paid a $5 show-up fee.   6 
could observe the ‘drop out’ prices of their competitors and learn from their bidding patterns.  As 
bidders bid, they revealed private information about the object to be sold.  Therefore, the 
remaining bidders could update their information about the object and bid accordingly.  In each 
session, the possibility of seller participation was carefully announced to the bidders.  It was 
made clear that this was the seller's choice and not a certainty.  The payoff functions and the 
feedback information on dropout prices could help them formulate and update their beliefs about 
the seller's participation strategy.
 9  Garvin and Kagel (1994) point out that bidders learn to adjust 
their strategies through their own experiences and observational learning.  Cooper and Kagel 
(2003) emphasize the importance of getting feedback regarding the outcomes of earlier auctions.  
They conclude that this information will help bidders adjust their ‘judgmental failures’.  The data 
obtained from this experiment allowed us to investigate the effect of shill bidding on prices and 
payoffs and bidders' learning within a session.  We could investigate if the sequential format of 
these auctions has any effect on the bidding pattern and whether observational learning plays an 
important role in formulating strategies. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
In order to familiarize the subjects with the auction process and let them gain some bidding 
experience, we did two dry runs each time and also used up the first two paid auctions as trial 
experiments.  From each session, we collected information for data analysis from 18 auctions, 9 
with and 9 without the possibility of seller participation.  We collected 81 observations from each 
session.  We have a total of 1616 observations from 359 auctions.
10  From this set of data, we 
could identify the winner of each auction, the second-highest bid, the number of bidders per 
                                                                 
9 As an alternative to the approach we took, we thought of having the program simulate the behavior of the 
seller so that we could explicitly announce the probability of participation, in anticipation of optimal 
bidding behavior.  However, since the bidder's behavior is not always optimal ( according to the 
experimental evidence in Kagel and Levin (1986) participants’ behavior significantly differs from the Nash 
equilibrium behavior), such  a seller's fixed strategy would not be optimal either.  As a result, any 
conclusion drawn from such an analysis would be useless with any slight deviation from the Nash 
equilibrium bidding strategies. We decided instead to let the bidders and the seller make their own 
decisions and evaluate the outcome. 
10  In one session, however, an error occurred when a bidder entered an auction other than the one under 
way at the time.  We did not observe a winner at this auction.  The bidders' cash balance was not updated 
and, as a result, we omitted the auction from our analysis.     7 
auctions, the value, the sellers' profits and participation patterns, each bidder's identity, profit, 
signal, dropout price, and cash balance. 
Based on these observations, we traced the participation patterns and the response of the 
bidders to changes in the bidding environment.  We analyzed the effect of shill bidding on prices 
and the variance of prices and examined if the entry decision of bidders was optimal or not in 
these auctions.  We also examined the robustness of the results to changes in the environment. 
 
4.1. Entry Decision 
The number of subjects who participated and submitted bids at these auctions was larger than 
the number predicted by economic theory but on par with other experimental findings (Kagel and 
Levin (1991)).  In a common value auction, a bidder should enter if the expected value of the item 
conditional on winning at the reserve exceeds the reserve price.  If the value is the average of the 
bidders' signals, the expected value of the item conditional on winning for a bidder whose signal 
is si can be expressed as: 
. for    ,
1



















In our case, with four potential bidders, the optimal reserve price is 5.5.  It was calculated to 
maximize profits when the bidders choose their optimal bidding strategies.
11  At this reserve, any 
bidder with a signal greater than or equal to 9 should enter the auction.  The following table 
presents participation statistics at two reserve prices used to do a comparative study.  
 
Table-1: Basic Participation Statistics 
 
Variable  Reserve 5.5  Reserve 6.25 































Probability of Bidder 
participation 
 










Probability of Seller submitting 
a Bid 
   
 
0.722      0.744 
                                                                 
11 See Appendix A for more details.   8 
Ten sessions were performed at a reserve of 5.5.  Based on the data collected in these 
sessions, we observed that the number of bidders who submitted bids was greater than expected 
by 1.146.
12  Excessive entry is likely to make shill bidding more profitable in our analysis than 
theory would predict.  Based on the fact that the current reserve leads to high participation rates, 
we decided to perform ten additional experimental sessions at a marginally higher reserve price of 
6.25 (see McAfee and Vincent (1992) on the issue of updating the reserve price).
13 At this 
reserve, optimally, only bidders with a signal greater than or equal to 10 should participate in the 
auctions. The results of the comparative study are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  
The announcement of seller participation did not have a significant impact on the number of 
participants and that is in agreement with the theory.  The number of legitimate bidders only 
changed from 3.393 to 3.367 at the reserve of 5.5 and from 3.478 to 3.600 at the reserve of 6.25.  
Theory predicts that the seller's potential to enter should not have an overall statistically 
significant effect on the probability to participate.  The entry decision should be based on the 
comparison of the reserve price with the expected value of the item conditional on winning at the 
reserve.  Since the seller does not have any valuable information to share with the bidders, the 
calculation of the expected value remains the same irrespective of his ability to participate.  The 
probability of bidder participation at the reserve of 5.5 was 0.848 when the seller was not allowed 
to participate and 0.841 when he was.  A test of these proportions reveals that their difference is 
statistically insignificant (with a z statistic of 0.258).  The difference in the probability of bidder 
participation between the two treatments at the reserve of 6.25 is statistically insignificant as well 
                                                                 
12 In an attempt to uncover their entry strategies, we calculated two other measures of discrepancy between 
observed and expected entry numbers.  The one measure shows the difference between the actual number 
of bidders and the number that would have entered if they calculated their returns based on an estimate of 
the common value conditional on their signal; this difference is 0.682.  The other measure provides the 
difference between the actual number of bidders and those with a signal greater than 5.  This was calculated 
to investigate whether bidders decided to enter based on a naïve direct comparison of their signal with the 
reserve.  This last strategy seems marginally the closest approximation to the observed behavior.  The 
discrepancy, however, between these two numbers is still large (the difference is 0.538), which makes this 
strategy as well an unlikely candidate for equilibrium behavior.   
13 Some researchers have speculated that the thrill of playing might be the dominant factor affecting the 
entry decision of some bidders.  Since there is no hard evidence on what motivates bidders to enter in larger 
proportions than the optimal strategy would dictate, we were reluctant to raise the reserve too much in our 
comparative statistics exercise to avoid introducing a reserve that would be too high.  A sub-optimal high 
reserve combined with shill bidding could artificially show that shill bidding is harmful.  A sub-optimal 
low reserve, on the other hand, can only overemphasize the benefits of shill bidding.  We kept the reserve 
low and still showed that shill bidding is harmful.     9 
(with a z statistic of -1.302).  The evidence in Table 1 is corroborated by the probit analysis, the 
results of which are presented in Table 2.   
   
Table-2: Probit Regression Results for the Probability of Bidding 
 


































































































  1.242* 
(0.304) 
 




  0.218* 
(0.100) 
 
  0.216* 
(0.100) 
   
 
















* Denotes 95% significance and ** Denotes 90% significance. 
 
In Table 2, we examine the probability to submit a bid as a function of bidder and auction-
specific independent variables.  This model allows us not only to test for differences in the 
probability to submit a bid across the two treatments but also to account for other observed 
patterns of behavior in the sequence of auctions.  The detailed description of the variables used in 
this regression is in Appendix A.  The results of the analysis reveal that the probability of 
submitting a bid is higher the higher the signals the bidders received.  The seller's potential to 
enter and the observation of profit in the previous auction had no statistically significant effect on 
the probability to submit a bid in a current auction.  These results are consistent with theory.  
The observation of seller participation in  an auction did not discourage entry in the 
subsequent auction.  In online auctions, reputation mechanisms established have shown that 
negative feedback has adverse effects but is not a huge deterrent of activity since the number of   10 
auction participants experiences continuous growth (see Bajari and Hortacsu (2004)). Contrary to 
what we expected, however, participation was greater at the higher reserve price.  
In conclusion, despite the fact that bidders did not make optimal entry decisions, the 
number of entrants was invariant to the possibility of seller participation.  
 
4.2. The Effect of Shill Bidding on Prices and Profits 
In this section, we first present a graph and basic statistics on relative bids and profits.  Then 
we use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure to statistically analyze our data.  
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Figure 1A: Seller's relative profit and bidding behavior when the reserve was 6.25.  The 
potential of participation was announced only in the last 9 auctions. 
 
Figure 1A shows the seller's relative profits and dropout prices in the series of auctions 
performed at the reserve of 6.25.  In every session, we ran 9 consecutive auctions without the 
possibility of seller participation followed by 9 consecutive auctions with the possibility of seller 
participation.
14  The profits and prices are calculated here relative to the value of each item.  For 
                                                                 
14 A figure presenting the profit of the seller at the reserve of 5.5 would not be informative because we 
changed the order of announcements in some sessions to check the robustness of our results to variations in   11 
every auction in the sequence, the estimates presented in Figure 1A are obtained by averaging out 
the corresponding quantities across the 10 sessions.  The graph reveals that sellers' relative profits 
are higher, on average, in the first 9 auctions of each session when the bidders are the only ones 
participating.  In the last 9 auctions, sellers were mixing their participation strategies; on average 
they submitted bids with a probability of 74.4%.  There was no seller who either participated all 
the time or did not participate at all.  Profits were lower when participation was possible.  The 
larger drop in expected profits occurred right after the announcement of seller participation was 
made.  The pattern in prices is similar to the pattern in profits. This is in agreement with the 
theoretical results reported by Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) which show that, in the 
present setting, the auctioneer (who cares about the price) is worse off with a shill bid equilibrium 
than with the no shill bid outcome.
  
Considering the data from all the auctions, on average, sellers submitted bids with a 
probability of 73.3%.  Their behavior led to lower profits there as well. 
 
Table-3: Relative prices and profits 
 






















Average Relative Dropout Price for 
Sellers 
 
    0.881 
(0.368) 









In fact, according to Table 3, the average relative profit of the seller went down from 97.5% 
to 88.9% of the value.  Our test revealed that the difference is statistically significant (t statistic is 
2.232.)  The average relative winning price for the bidders at the same time dropped slightly from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the format.  In half the sessions, in auctions 1-9, the seller had to be passive and in auctions 10-18 he could 
be potentially active.  In the other half he had to be passive in auctions 1-5 and 10-13 and could be active in 
the remaining auctions.   12 
102.6% of the value to 98.1%.  The difference in prices across the two treatments showed to be 
statistically significant as well (t statistic is 2.223).  Once more, the main drop was observed right 
after the first announcement of the potential for seller participation was made.  The bidders' 
profits were, on average, 2.6% of the value in the auctions without seller participation and 1.9% 
of the value in the auctions when the potential of seller participation was announced.
 15 
The basic statistics appearing in Table 3 do not provide any controls for a variety of factors 
that affect prices and profits.  For that reason, we used the MLE procedure to identify the effect of 
shill bidding on the expected value and variance of prices and profits.  The basic structure of the 
regression model is as follows:  
 
, i i Z XB y e + G + =    
), , 0 ( ~
2
i i N s e where 
. i i Z X g s + Y + F =  
 
We use two dependent variables in our analysis: price and profit.  The independent variables 
include two sets of controls: auction specific quantitative variables (X) and, auction specific 
qualitative variables (Z).  We assume that the standard deviation of prices and profits depend on 
the same set of variables to allow for more flexibility.  The description of those variables is 
detailed in Appendix A.  We used a variable on the observed number of participants in the last 
auction to estimate the aggressiveness of opponents based on observed patterns of participation.  
We also included the order of auctions in the sequence and the profit (or loss) in a previous 
auction.  We accounted for the seller’s potential entry (shill bidding) and his participation in a 
previous auction.  We included differences in the design, reserve, and values.  In the profit 
equation, we also introduced the variable “Seller Wins the Auction.”  This variable identifies the 
                                                                 
15 Our analysis considers the overall effect of shill bidding on prices and profits without concentrating on 
comparison of individual bids to equilibrium bids.  We compare entry decisions to equilibrium behavior 
only where such an approach is feasible.  Notice that, o nce a bidder enters, each bid submitted is 
conditioned on information that is obtained by inverting the bidding function and uncovering the other 
bidders' signals.  This process requires knowledge on our behalf of the bidders' beliefs about the probability 
of the seller's participation.  This is information we do not have.  Even if we knew the beliefs, a direct 
comparison of actual bids to optimal bids would be quite misleading, since a potential error in the 
calculation made by one bidder would propagate a series of mistakes in calculations by the rest.  As a 
result, some optimally behaving bidders could seem to behave sub-optimally.    13 
cases in which the seller wins the auction and forgoes the price; when it is included in the model, 
it allows us to isolate through the variable on potential entry announcement the effect of seller 
participation on the price the bidders pay.  Table 4 presents the results of this analysis.   
In this analysis, we recognized that, if the signals play an important role in determining the 
bidding strategy, then the standard deviation of prices could be related to the standard deviation 
of signals.  The standard deviation could also be a function of the expected number of bidders in 
an auction, the seller's potential to enter, his participation in previous auctions, the level of the 
reserve price, and the potential for profit.  
Table 4 presents a maximum likelihood estimation of prices and profits as a function of the 
observable factors described above.  It suggests that the value of the item has a positive effect on 
the price.  The number of bidders in the previous auction pushes the price up because it created 
expectations for patterns of greater participation.  This is not consistent with the theory, but it is 
consistent with other experimental findings.  In particular, Kagel and Levin (1986) find that, as 
the number of bidders increases, the price also increases.  
The potential of seller participation affects bidders’ beliefs and makes them bid and win at 
lower prices.  The observation of seller shilling in previous auctions has a negative but marginally 
significant effect on prices.  Observation of past performance through various reputation 
mechanisms established in web auctions have shown that negative feedback can have adverse 
effects. Those effects vary and may depend also on the value of the object sold (Ba and Pavlou, 
(2002)).   
The bidders bid higher and higher in the sequence of items auctioned off in a session.  
There have been many studies documenting increasing and decreasing patterns of prices 
in sequential auctions.  The most relevant study for the present framework, however, is 
that by Milgrom and Weber (2000) who predict that, in a model with affiliated values (an 
extreme form of which is having common values), there will be an increasing pattern of 
prices in the sequence.  The change in the reserve price does not seem to have a 
significant effect on the average price but it has an effect on the standard deviation of 
prices.  The higher reserve leads to lower variability in prices.  The order of the 
treatments does not affect the outcome.    14 
Table-4: ML Estimation Results 
 
Independent Variable  Dependent Variable 

























































































Seller Wins the Auctions 
 
      -9.191* 
(0.676) 
Parameter Estimates of 













































































































* Denotes 95% significance and ** Denotes 90% significance. 
   15 
Table 4 offers no clear indication of some significant positive effect of the standard 
deviation of signals on the standard deviation of the price.  The seller's potential entry 
decision would be expected to lower the variability in the price since it could lead to less 
aggressive bidding behavior.  This effect is, however, statistically insignificant.  
The seller's profit is higher with the value of the item to the bidders, the number of bidders 
observed in the previous auction, and the order of auctions in the sequence.  The announcement 
of the potential of seller participation has a negative effect on profit not only because the seller 
runs the risk of buying his own item but also because the bidders pay a lower price on average.  
In particular, when the variable “Seller Wins the Auction” is introduced in the profit equation (in 
the fourth column of Table 4) to isolate the instances in which the seller is awarded the item, the 
variable “Seller's Potential Entry” remains significant.  As Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) 
have shown, shill bidding makes the seller worse off.  Our experimental results agree with their 
findings.  Any out-of-auction mechanism that would force sellers to abstain from participation 
could increase their profits.  Rothkopf and Harstad (1995) presented a theoretical dynamic model 
of cheating in Vickrey auctions showing also significant adverse effects.  In their case, bidders 
are not fully rational and they punish cheating whenever it can be verified.  A trusted seller cheats 
when it pays and eventually destroys his reputation. The increase in the reserve does not have a 
statistically significant effect on either the expected value or the standard deviation of profits.  
In Table 5, we included variables to capture the actual participation patterns of sellers.  One 
variable controls for instances in which the seller is not allowed to p articipate, and another 
instances in which he is actually participating (a fact that is not observable by the rest of the 
bidders).  The control group represents the cases in which the seller had the opportunity but chose 
to abstain from participation.  Once more, the regression results suggest that the seller is better off 
with an enforcement mechanism that reduces his ability to participate.  In particular, his payoff is 
the lowest when he enters and bids in the auction.  
We also tested the robustness of our results to changes in the order of announcements.  
The MLE results indicate that it does not make any statistically significant difference in 
either the price or the seller's profit.  The seller's revenue is lower when the potential of 
participation is announced.  In all equations, the observation of profit or loss in the 
previous auction does not seem to affect either prices or profits.    16 
Table-5: ML Regression Results 
 
Independent Variable  Dependent Variable 
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Seller Wins the Auctions 
 
  -8.659* 
(0.721) 
Parameter Estimates of 































































* Denotes 95% significance and ** Denotes 90% significance. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the effect of shill bidding in online auctions on the seller's payoff and on 
price.  Shill bidding makes the seller worse off.  The price at the auction decreases as bidders 
anticipate the behavior of the seller and adjust their bidding strategies.  Both of these findings are 
consistent with the theoretical results of Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004).  Even though 
their entry decision is invariant to the announcement of seller participation, there are too many 
bidders who are eager to submit bids at these auctions.  Observational learning plays a role in 
determining bidding strategies.  The observation of consistently large past participation affects 
their bidding.  As Milgrom and Weber (2000) predicted, overall there is an increasing pattern of 
prices in the sequence.  We conclude that the possibility of shill bidding alleviates the problem of 
the winner's curse in a common value auction and becomes beneficial for bidders but harmful for 
the seller.  
    18 
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Appendix A 
 
CALCULATION OF THE OPTIMAL RESERVE 
 
We need to determine the minimum entering signal s that allows the seller to maximize his profit 
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where  4 3 2 1 , , , y y y y  are order statistics. 
 
 
Choosing s to maximize this expression yields a value of s = 8.57977.  Since we have discrete 
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Description and Construction of the Independent Variable 
Price  The ‘Price’ is the drop out price of the second highest bidder. 
 
Seller’s Profit  Seller’s profit is the price minus a commission of 5% that 
goes to the auctioneer as payment for the services rendered.  
If a seller does not participate at all or if he participate and he 
is not the highest bidder, then the seller will receive the price 
minus the commission.  If seller becomes the highest bidder 
in an auction then he will not receive any payment on this 
item but he will still have to pay 5% as the commission even 




This is the value of the item to the bidders.  This value is 
constructed as the average of the bidder's signals.  
 
Number of Bidders in the Previous 
Auction 
This variable represents the observed number of participants 
in the last auction.  It allows us to control for the 
aggressiveness of opponents based on observed patterns of 
participation.   
 
Potential Profit or Loss in Previous 
Auction 
This variable captures the difference between the value and 
the price that makes up the profit or loss accruing to the 
winner of the previous auction.   
 
Order of Auction in the Sequence 
 
The variable captures effects that relate to the sequential 
nature of the auction in each session.  
 
Seller's Potential Entry 
 
This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in auctions 
in which the potential of participation is announced and zero 
when the seller is not allowed to participate.   
 
Seller Participation in the Previous 
Auction 
This is dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if there 
were 5 bidders in the previous auction and therefore, the 
bidders observed with certainty the shiller bidding and zero 
otherwise 
 
Design   This dummy variable controls for the change in order of the 
treatments.  For 5 of the experimental sessions performed at 
the reserve of 5.5 and 10 performed at the reserve of 6.25 the 
rules were as follows: the seller had to be passive in the first 
half of the auctions that took place.  For 5 sessions performed 
at the reserve of 5.5, we changed the order of announcement 
to check if our results are robust.  The seller had to be passive 
in auctions 1-5 and 10-13 and he could be active in the 
remaining auctions.   For those five sessions the design 
dummy takes the value of 1 and 0 in all other sessions 
 
 
Reserve  This is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the reserve is 
6.25 and zero when it is 5.5. 
 
   22 
Seller Wins the Auctions 
 
This is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when seller 
wins the auction.  This variable is introduced only in the profit 
equation to control for the instances in which the seller is 
awarded the item.  Further, it allows the variable on potential 
entry announcement to isolate the effect of seller participation 
on the price the bidders pay. 
 
The Seller is not Allowed to Participate  This variable takes the value of 1 in auctions in which we 
announced that the seller could not participate.  This variable 
is used only when the seller’s profit is analyzed.  
 
The Seller is Participating  This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the seller 
participated in an auction.  Note that, the rest of the bidders do 
not observe when the seller actually participates.  This 
variable was used only for a seller’s profit ML estimation.  
 
Standard Deviation of the Signals 
 
In each auction bidders received 4 signals.  The standard 
deviation of these four signals is used in the maximum 
likelihood variance equation.  This variable will be 
controlling for signal variability. 
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Appendix B  (REFEREE APPENDIX)  
 
INSTRUCTIONS  
(The instructions were read to all participants.)  
 
I. INITIAL SET OF INSTRUCTIONS  
Instructions to the bidders: 
Welcome to the experiment!  We will  hold a series of online auctions following the same rules 
each time.  The instructions are simple.  If you read them carefully, take into account the 
reasoning of the other players and decide sensibly, you will make some money.  Your profit 
depends on your success.  Participation is voluntary.  You are by no means obliged to participate 
in the experiment but if you do, you will get the chance to make some money if you make the 
right decisions.  For each point that you will obtain in the experiment you will receive a quarter.  
The Game.  The game will be played by groups of 4 people.  If you decide to participate you will 
receive a starting balance of 60 points (That's $15).  We will auction off 22 items, one at a time.  
Each item will be auctioned off to the highest bidder.  The rules are slightly different than the 
rules of the standard auctions that you see online.  Here are the differences:  
The Value.  Every one of the 22 items has a different value.  The value of each item is 
determined as follows: Each person will receive a signal at the beginning of each auction.  The 
signal could be any integer between 0 and 20.  All these numbers are equally likely.  A person 
only knows his/her own signal.  The value of the item is the same for all bidders; it is the average 
of the signals received by the 4 bidders.  For example, if you received a signal of 0 and the signals 
received by the rest of the bidders are 9, 6, and 17, the common value of the item to all bidders 
will be:  8
4
17 6 9 0
=
+ + +
.  Your signal will be shown at the top border of your screen.  You 
will always get information about your own signal.  You will not get to know the signals of the 
other bidders before the end of the auction.  When all members of a group receive their signal, the 
object is auctioned off.  
The Rules of the Auction.  When the auction begins a reserve price (a minimum acceptable bid) 
will be posted on your screen.  After you receive your signal you will have a minute to decide 
whether to participate.  If you decide to partici pate you have to press the button that says 
"participation" and wait for the rest of the bidders to make a decision.  This is the only chance 
you will get to decide whether you are going to participate and bid in this particular auction.  (If   24 
you don't find it profitable to participate in this auction, based on the information that you 
received on this item, you can still participate in the next round of auctions.)  The value of the 
item depends on the signal of all 4 people no matter whether they decided to participate or not.  
  In the middle of the screen, you will see a button that shows a bid slowly counting upwards 
like a clock.  Every active participant sees the same clock on his or her screen.  When you press 
this button on your screen that says "Bid Here" your clock with stop counting up and you will 
leave the auction.  The bid at which you pressed the button is called the "dropout price".  The 
auction will continue with the participants that have not yet pressed their own buttons.  When 
only one person remains in the auction, this person leaves automatically and obtains the object at 
the price that is currently indicated i.e., the dropout price of the second highest bidder that left the 
auction.  For example, if there are two bidders remaining active in the auction and the one decides 
to dropout at the price of 7, the other bidder is awarded the item at 7.    
  The person that manages to obtain the object receives a certain amount of points on his or her 
account; this amount is determined by the common value of the item to all bidders minus the bid 
of the second highest bidder that left the auction.  In the previous example, if the (common) value 
of the item is 8 (i.e., the average of the signal of all four bidders) and the dropout price of the 
second highest bidder is 7 then the highest bidder will earn a profit of 8-7=1 that will be added to 
his account.  If the dropout price of the second highest bidder was 11, however, the person that is 
awarded the item will lose 11-8 = 3 that will be subtracted from his account balance. 
Bankruptcy Policy.  As we mentioned before, you will have a 60-point balance in you account 
available for bidding.  This is the maximum amount of points you can use bidding in these 
auctions.  If at some point of time you lose all points overbidding on a series of items you will not 
get a chance to reenter and bid in subsequent rounds.  
Useful Information on the Screen.  As you decide on your strategy take into account the 
behavior of other participants.  The dropout prices of the other participants are reported on the 
screen in the column that has the title bidding history.  As soon as any player leaves the auction 
his dropout price becomes an entry in the bidding history.  At the end of every round your 
remaining cash balance and the profit or loss will be displayed on the screen.  You will also see 
the winning bid and the value of the item to the bidders.  
  To enter the experiment logon to http://129.15.117.138/NewDB/Georgia/page1.asp 
Good luck!   25 
 
Instructions to the seller:  
For the first 12 rounds you will have the opportunity to observe the outcome in each auction, the 
bids and values of the items auctioned off.  After the end of the first 12 auctions in the session, 
the rules will change and you will be given the opportunity to participate if you wish.  You will 
receive further instructions at the end of round 12.  Logon to  http://129.15.117.138/NewDB 
/Georgia/page33.asp to observe the bidding process during the first 12 auctions. 
 
II. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Instructions to Bidders:  
For the next set of auctions the seller has the opportunity to enter and bid if he finds it beneficial.  
The seller does not have any signal that could convey additional information about the value of 
the item to you.  Whether the seller decides to participate or not and his/her identity will not be 
revealed during these auctions.  
 
Instructions to the Seller: 
 
Your value of the item is zero and it is independent of the value of other participants.  Your initial 
cash balance will be 60 points.  For each p oint that you will obtain in the experiment you will 
receive a dime.  At this point in the experiment you have the opportunity to enter and participate if 
you wish.  Every time an item is auctioned off to one of the bidders, independent of your 
participation decision, you will receive the price minus a commission of 5% that goes to the 
auctioneer as payment for the services rendered.  If you become the highest bidder in an auction you 
will not receive any payment on this item but you will still have to pay 5% as the commission even 
if the item is not sold to an actual bidder.  For example, if you are the last active person at the 
auction and the second highest bidder dropped out at a price of 9 you will have to pay 5% of 9 
which is 0.45.  If you do not participate at all or if you participate and you are not the highest bidder 
you will receive the price minus the commission.  For example, if the second highest dropout price 
is 6 you will receive 6 and you will pay 5% of the price to the auctioneer.  As a result your net profit 
will be 5.7.  The bankruptcy policy that applies to the bidders applies to you too.   26 
 
 

















Figure 2B: After a bidder enters the session and auction number that is announced, he/she gets to see a 






















Figure 3B: A bidder who decides to participate at the auction sees the digital clock on his screen, 

















Figure 5B: When the auction is concluded, the bidding history, the winning bid, the value of the item to the 










Figure 6B: A bidder who does not participate at the auction gets the same information as every other bidder 









Figure 7B: At the end of every auction, those who do not participate observe the same information on the 
screen as those who participate.   33 
 







Figure 8B: When the seller is not participating, he/she gets to observe the outcome of the auction, including 
the bids, from the following observation window.  All the information that is available to bidders is 







Figure 9B: This is the screen that the administrator uses to control the auction process and proceed from 








Figure 10B: Once an administrator chooses the session and auction number, he/she observes the number of 
people that entered to participate at the auction and can wait until all potential bidders have made up their 



























Figure 11B: The administrator can see, on this screen, how many participants are there and how many have 
dropped out of the auction so that he/she can continue the process without interruption in the thought 
process of bidders. 









Figure 12B: Once an auction ends, the number of dropouts will equal the number of participants and the 
winning bid will appear on the administrator's screen.  
 
 